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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED

Plainti ff/Appellee,

Criminal No. 111600055
Appellate Case No. 20140851-CA
Trial Judge: MARVIN D. BAGLEY

v.

PAUL DUBRAE WALDOCH,
Defendant/A

ellant.

I.
JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42 (a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the case
having been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78A-4-103(2)(j) (1953, as amended).

II.
RESOLUTION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellee sets forth what it believes to be the facts recited in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict consistent with State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d, 1201, 1205-06
(Utah, 1993). This amounts to simply picking out those portions of the transcript that
Appellee believes to be sufficient to support the convictions but making no attempt to
reconcile the non-conforming evidence and testimony presented at trial, identified in
Appellant's brief, the evidence which is inconsistent or contrary to the assertions made by

the victim.
This amounts to stating that the victim's testimony was sufficient and generally
purporting that her assertion of non-consensual contact is corroborated by the fact that
she had bruising on her ribcage and on both thighs, vaginal abrasions and that DNA
testing found seminal fluid on her sweater.
The Appellee does not attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in the physical
evidence regarding DNA testing, the issue of abrasion verses laceration, as it pertains to
consensual v. non-consensual contact or the testimony of at least one expert witness. In
short, the Appellant makes no effort to recognize the physical evidence inconsistent with
the victim's assertion of non-consensual contact, choosing to simply ignore it. The
Appellant takes the position that this is not a case of his word against her word. Rather,
one where the physical evidence supports Appellant's version of the facts and does not
support the assertions made by the victim that such contact was non-consensual. The case
is further complicated by the fact that other events occurred at the trial which
compromised the jury deliberation process and impacted its outcome. This included
having a husband and wife serve in the same jury, not making full and complete
admonition regarding any discussion of the case prior to deliberation, the prosecutor
appealing to the jury's passions and prejudices, attempting to invoke sympathy for the
victim rather than address the factual findings made by the State's witnesses; getting the
jury to relive the victim's experience instead of addressing the inconsistencies and
medical testimony, and deliberation was also compromised by Appellant receiving
2

ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel not objecting to what had transpired.

III.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
POINTNO.1
THE APPELLANT'S GENERAL ASSERTION OF SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE MISSES THE DISTINSTION RASIED AT TRIAL EVIDENCING
CONSENSUAL OVER NON-CONSENSUAL CONTACT

The primary distinction in the evidence which appears to be missed by Appellee is
the evidence on injuries which is not consistent with non-consensual contact. Rather, the
injuries sustained confinn consensual contact and are inconsistent with the victim's
testimony. This case is unique in that it shows how physical evidence must be reconciled
to eliminate reasonable doubt.
Notwithstanding the Appellee's assertion, the testimony at the trial showed that
the physical evidence did not support the victim's assertion of penetration and where the
conduct occurred while she was sitting upright in a vehicle, penetration would not have
been possible without her making accommodation by repositioning her lower body to
allow for it. Non-consensual contact would have left laceration not abrasion. Laceration
is the injury that would have corroborated the victim's testimony. Abrasion does not.
Abrasion is not inconsistent with consensual contact and the evidence presented at trial
does not exclude the possibility that this was the result of contact over clothing or caused
by the clothing itself. In other words, the physical evidence is not as suggested by
3

Appellee consistent with the victim's testimony and does not corroborate her testimony.
Still, it is the evidence presented at trial is what it is and this constitutes the basis upon
which the jury's convictions are to be sustained. It would be inappropriate for a jury to
simply ignore the inconsistent physical evidence just as it should be inappropriate for this
Court to ignore such to sustain a conviction based only upon the testimony of the victim
with such inconsistent physical evidence. The evidence in this case presents a
circumstance consistent with State v Maestas, 2012 UT, 46, 299 P. 3d 892, that it is
sufficient to disturb a jury verdict where it is physically impossible or obviously false.
The physical evidence here reveals circumstances upon which the victim asserts nonconsensual penetration, physically impossible and/or obviously false without her
accommodating such penetration by repositioning herself while sitting upright in her
vehicle. Moreover, the testimony of the victim is not precise. There is no clear evidence
of penetration. Rather, the evidence of penetration is cobbled together by the victim's
imprecise assertion with regard to penetration where conclusions are drawn from medical
personnel based upon abrasion, an injury consistent with consensual contact. This does
not make the evidence sufficient to confirm the conviction of object rape but points out
clearly the insufficiency of it.
Ill

Ill
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POINT NO. 2
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE
BRIEFING IS SUFFICIENT AND COMPLETE.

Appellee attempts to assert that Appellant has not met its burden under Rule 24,
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, by failing to cite to authority or offering reasoned
analysis on that authority. The reply is a simple one. There is no such authority in the
State of Utah because this is a matter of first impression. Appellant has addressed the
issues of concern which even the case law cited by Appellee support. In short, when
circumstances arise where a husband and wife are serving on the same jury, the trial court
should have been prompted to make further inquiry into each juror's ability to render an
independent decision or to dismiss one of the two as having a relationship too close as to
imply a bias or undue influence depriving the Appellant of his right to have the matter
tried before an impartial and fair jury. The circumstances were discussed in detail and
presented in the context or Rule 17 (k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals
with making appropriate and complete admonition and in the present case this was never
done. Appellee cites to Childs v State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48 ( 1987) in support of
its assertion that the great weight of case law from other jurisdictions shows that having
spouses on juries does not constitute error; however, in that case, spouses serving on
juries was never discussed let alone addressed in the context suggested by Appellee. In
State v Richie, 960 P.2d 1227, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the matter but
considered allowing such to occur only upon the assurance that further voir dire inquiry
5

was made. In pertinent part, it stated:

We disagree with Richie's assertion that jurors that are married to each other must
be disqualified from jury service. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson expressly stated
during voir dire that they would each make their own decisions and would not
automatically go along with the other person. Thus, there is no evidence that Mr.
and Mrs. Ferguson was incapable of fulfilling his or her responsibilities as a juror.
Richie cannot demonstrate actual impairment of the Fergusons' ability to serve as
jurors. Id at 1244.
The court in that case went on to suggest that there was an implied bias where a
perspective juror is a prosecutor employed at the same office as the prosecutor trying the
defendant but found that to be a disguising characteristic in the case before it. In the
present case, this part of the admonition was never sufficiently given particularly in light
of the fact that two of the juror would be returning home to the same household.

In Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
followed a procedure that should have been followed in the present case. In that case, the
Court stated as follows:
Following individual voir dire and prior to commencement of general voir dire,
Harris noted that the remaining panel included two married couples, jurors' 28 and
29, and another couple. Arguing that these jurors would not be independent but
would unduly influence each other and also they would find it difficult not to
discuss the case as it was proceeding, Harris moved to have one member of each
couple randomly selected and dismissed. The trial court denied the motion at that
point in time, ruling instead that the couples could be questioned and if their
answers confirmed Harris' concerns one member of the couples could then be
removed. During general voir dire Harris referred to these couples and asked them
whether they would not find it difficult to refrain from discussing the case as it
was going on. Both couples gave assurance, however, that they would be able to
abide by the admonition not to discuss the case. Harris did not ask these couples
whether they would be apt to influence each other, and he did not renew his
6
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objection at the end of the voir dire and did not remove either juror 28 or 29
peremptorily. Both served on the jury. Id at 49
When the Appellant in that case challenged the married jurors status, the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated as follows:
Indeed, we have held that notwithstanding a perspective jurors responses during
voir dire, whatever his or her protestation of lack of bias, the jurors close
relationship, (be it familial, financial or situational, with any of the parties,
counsel, victims or witnesses) is sufficient to require the court (to sustain the
challenge for cause and excuse the juror). (Citation omitted). This is so, we
explained, because however sincere and well-meaning such prospective jurors
may be, such close personal relationships are apt to unconsciously affect their
decision in the case. (Citation omitted). Bias, however, presumptive or otherwise
refers generally to jurors favoring or disfavoring one side of the case or the other,
a risk not posed by relationships between jurors. For that reason, the few courts
that have addressed the issue of married jurors have held that such jurors are not
presumptively disqualified and that their independence may be adequately assured
through voir dire. Id at 50.
Again, this is what did not occur in the present case. In other words, the great
weight of authority cited by Appellee supports the proposition that having married jurors
serve on the same jury prompts a more detailed voir dire questioning and admonition
which did not occur. This case is the consequence of inadequate inquiry by the trial court
or defense counsel's failure to object and it was error on the part of the court or
ineffective assistance of counsel and in either case the matter warrants remand.
Ill

Ill
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POINT NO. 3

THE CIRCUMSTANCE INVOLVING A HUSBAND AND WIFE SERVING ON THE
SAME JURY IS AN EXCEPTIONAL ONE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER
THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE.

Appellee treats the circumstance involving married jurors the same as something
one might see in the normal course of jury selection or deliberation. The event is so rare
that there is no previous Utah authority on the matter that attempts to address the issue.
Since Mrs. Rasmussen only served as an alternate and did not participate in the
deliberation process, the Appellee contends that it is not really an issue. This position
misses the point entirely. The issue is one of influence upon those who did serve on the
jury and to that extent the influence does not simply go away by having the alternate
dismissed. In fact, the entire voir dire process becomes unreliable when it comes to
relationships that are so closely connected. To assume that such influence would not be
present or not have an impact simply because each married member of the jury responded
appropriately to voir dire questions seems to cast a blind eye upon the process for which
the very purpose is to preserve a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. It makes a
mockery of the entire voir dire process. This is exactly the kind of undue influence that
cannot be cured through voir dire on rehabilitated by asking additional questions.
Appellee argues that Appellant failed in establishing that such a circumstance is a rare
one simply because Appellant has failed to cite to authority calling it such. The
8
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circumstances of this case are even more rare because there is no such authority
addressing this situation in that context.

POINT NO. 4

THIS CASE WARRANTS A STAND ARD OF PRESUMED PREJUDICE
To hold Appellant to establish actual prejudice verses a presumed standard creates
an impossible burden. The Appellant argues that when it concerns the impact of one juror
upon another this can never be established when such inquiries are barred through the
deliberation process under Rule 606, the Utah Rules of Evidence. The only way such
information would come to light after deliberation would be through the testimony of
another member of the jury and this would be disqualified to the extent that is was not
presented extraneously or manifested as an outside influence improperly utilized by the
jury. This is exactly why the influence of a spouse is one that should give rise to
suspicion because it would not necessarily manifest itself in such outward expression.
Rather, it is the type of influence and impact that would not necessarily be declared or
conveyed through the deliberation process but would have its influence upon
deliberation. While Appellee cites to various sources in conjunction with a standard of
actual prejudice, the circumstance before the Court is unique and not one upon which the
failure to admonish concerned a jury of this composition. Therefore, the cases cited do
not reflect the heightened sensitivity upon the issue as to why such failure to admonish
9

should be presumed prejudicial.
The same argument applies with regard to a show of actual bias. Again as
explained above, the circumstances go beyond merely a juror responding appropriately to
questions being asked but due to the relationship require a deeper inquiry to ensure that
the Appellant receives a fair and impartial jury at trial. However, the circumstances of the
present case are void of any such inquiry entirely and this was due to the fact that such
inquiry was never made either by the Court or by defense counsel.

POINT NO. 5
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Appellee finds no inconsistency in arguing that issues on appeal have not
been preserved and failed to qualify under the Plain Error Doctrine and at the same time
argue that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellee attempts to argue that
the fact that defense counsel did not object or make more adequate inquiry into jury
selection was somehow a calculated trial strategy which is not manifested in the record.
There is no sound trial strategy which would have condoned keeping a husband and wife
on a jury involving a criminal case of sexual abuse and object rape. In short, the
performance of defense counsel was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by
suffering a conviction, see Strictland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Ill
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POINT NO. 6

APPELLANT HAS ADEOUATEL Y ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT AS IT PERTAINS TO APPEALING TO JUROR'S PASSIONS
AND PREJUDICES CONCERNING THE VICTIM.

This was a case that came down to an issue of evidence regarding consensual
verses non consensual contact. One where the victim's testimony was called into question
and the issues before the trial court concerned those as to whether or not the medical
testimony corroborated her assertion. The fact is that the physical evidence did not
corroborate the testimony of the victim and as a result the prosecutor enticed the jury to
follow a course to get its members to relive the event from the victim's perspective and
made an appeal vouching for her truthfulness and how she might feel if they ruled against
her. Having the prosecutor vouch for the truthfulness of the victim is not appropriate in
closing argument. Addressing the matter in the context in having jurors relive the
victim's experience appealing to their sympathies for the victim is also not appropriate.
The impact that it had upon the jury is a matter that cannot be preserved due to the Rules
of Evidence that have been heretofore addressed. Counsel for the defense was ineffective
in failing to make a proper objection notwithstanding the fact that the parties approached
the bench during the prosecutor's closing argument which seemed to have diverted at
least in part the direction which the prosecutor was intending to argue. It is, however, in
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light of all these factors that the matter should be considered as a whole. In particular the
evidence in not precise nor sufficient to establish the key element of penetration for
purposes of the rape charge and this has been compromised by the unusual makeup of the
jury in light of the status of two of its members, as well as, ineffective representation at
trial, incomplete and infrequent admonition and prosecutorial misconduct during closing
argument. When viewing the matter in its entirety, there can be no doubt that the
Appellant in this case failed to receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury. In fact, it is the
obvious nature of these particular characteristics that make this case a particularly
egregious one since the process itself is one focused on addressing such concerns with
particularity to ensure that a situation such as this one does not arise and in fact it is a
situation that has not manifested itself in the State of Utah at least to the extent of this
Court has addressed such concerns in the past. In light of these circumstances, the
Appellant asserts that the case should be remanded for a new trial.
IV.
CONCLUSION

On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant prays
that this Court reverse or remand as it deems appropriate together with such other and
further relief as to it appears equitable and proper.

DATED this

/✓zr.y o f - ¥ , 20 ;,,-:rJ. BR-ei'JACKSON
Counsel for Appellant
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